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I. INTRODUCTION
2012 was a landmark year for the civil rights of lesbians and gay men
in the United States. For the first time ever, three states approved same-sex
marriage and one state voted down a constitutional ban through a popular
vote. Same-sex marriage, and civil rights in general, have a tortured history
in public referenda. Many scholars and advocates have correctly pointed out
the structural problems with LGBT rights and direct democracy.' But re-
cent developments in election law are changing the way that statewide pub-
lic referenda work. Financial disclosure rules and electoral transparency law
J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, May 2013. I would like to
thank Ellen Katz for her support from this note's inception. I would also like to
thank Don Herzog, Amanda Grigg, Dan Siegel, and John Lovett for their helpful
notes. Lastly, thanks to Daniel Nadal, Greer Donley, Courtney Potter, Emily Miller,
Liz Lamoste, and Lauren Rivard at MJGL.
1. See, e.g., Paula Abrams, The Majority Will: A Case Study ofMisinformation, Manipu-
lation, and the Oregon Initiative Process, 87 OR. L. REv. 1025 (2008); Hans A. Linde,
When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government"- The Campaign Against
Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19 (1993); Kaitlyn Redfield-Ortiz, Government by the
People for the People? Representative Democracy, Direct Democracy, and the Unfinished
Struggle for Gay Civil Rights, 43 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1367 (2011).
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are shifting public votes from direct democracy by secret ballot to some-
thing more public and more in tune with some political theorists' ideal of
democratic decision making.
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Doe v. Reed that
Washington citizens who signed a petition to eliminate legal rights for
LGBT couples did not have a right to keep their names secret. A year later,
in ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen,3 a district court in California partially re-
lied on Reed to reject a similar request from groups who lobbied for Califor-
nia Proposition 8-a constitutional amendment that overturned the
California Supreme Court's landmark 2008 gay marriage decision.4 These
holdings are important to election law, feminist, and first amendment
scholars for a number of reasons. First, they flip the traditional roles of the
civil rights litigants from earlier cases, like NAACP v. Alabama.5 In those
early cases, publicly persecuted groups sought protection from disclosure
laws, but, here, the persecutors themselves are looking for help. Second, the
Doe v. Reed opinion, and especially Justice Scalia's concurrence, articulate an
age-old conception of republican citizenship, one supported by a number of
modern and contemporary political theorists. Last, this conception of citi-
zenship has interesting, and largely positive, implications for political polari-
zation, especially in the context of LGBT rights. It facilitates the realization
of the fruits of hard-fought public opinion victories by the LGBT commu-
nity and their allies.
The Reed holding has the potential to help turn the ever-growing sup-
port for LGBT rights into concrete policies in the next decade. Marriage
rights and employment protections for gays, lesbians, and transgender
Americans have been put up for public referenda in a number of states.
While the last few months have seen a number of key victories for the
LGBT community, most states still have laws preventing gay and lesbian
couples from marrying. Increased transparency might be good for LGBT
legislative battles for a number of reasons.
I argue that the LGBT movement is at a place where embracing
Scalia's combative public citizenship is a winning strategy. Justice Scalia has
provided the LGBT community with a critical weapon in its fight for mar-
riage equality. By examining political science literature and public opinion
polling, I hope to show that making public ballot initiatives transparent will
curb the trend of states taking away rights and privileges from their LGBT
citizens. I share the concerns of commentators like Cass Sunstein, who fear
2. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2011).
3. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
4. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008).
5. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
[Vol. 20:129130
OUTING THE MAJORITY
the phenomenon of insular political communities moving to extremes. I
also share the concerns of thinkers ranging from James Madison to Alexis de
Tocqueville to modern day political scientists about political majorities
targeting unpopular minorities in winner-take-all elections. The "brave citi-
zen" of Scalia's concurrence is a conception of deliberative democracy that
serves the LGBT community well.
In this Note I look at the likely impact of Doe v. Reed on the politics
of the fight for LGBT rights. In Part II I examine Reed and ProtectMar-
riage.com. In Part III I look at a specific concept from these cases, which I
label Scalia's "civic courage" from the phrase he used at oral argument and
in his concurrence. Part IV looks at polarization, first by examining theories
of polarization and then by looking at research on attitudes toward the
LGBT community. Lastly, in Part V I argue that transparency and Scalia's
civic courage are welcome additions to public referenda dealing with gay
rights.
II. THE CASES
A. Doe v. Reed-Petition Signatures
In May 2009, Washington Governor Christine Gregoire signed Senate
Bill 5688 into law. The bill, colloquially called an everything-but-marriage
law, provided a number of rights for same sex partners.6 The bill's preamble
made its goals clear: "[i]t is the intent of the legislature that for all purposes
under state law, state registered domestic partners shall be treated the same
as married spouses. . . . The provisions of this act shall be liberally con-
strued to achieve equal treatment . . . of state registered domestic partners
and married spouses."7 While the legislation passed the Washington House
and Senate by wide margins, it garnered energetic opposition among a por-
tion of the Washington electorate.
Washington's constitution allows "referendum measures" wherein a
group of citizens can collect signatures and put a recently passed law up for
a popular vote.8 A group known as Protect Marriage Washington immedi-
ately began gathering signatures to repeal the act. Washington citizens in
favor of putting the bill on the ballot gave Protect Marriage their names and
addresses. The group succeeded in collecting the requisite amount of signa-
tures but ultimately failed at overruling the legislation. Their efforts, which
6. Lornet Turnbull, Janet Tu & Susan Kelleher, 'Everything But Marriage'Backers Smell-
ing Victory, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at Al.
7. S.B. 5688, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/
documents/billdocs/2009-I0/Pdf/Bills/Senate%2OBills/5688.pdf.
8. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(b)-(d).
2013] 131
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
would become Washington Referendum 71, lost the public referendum by a
respectable six-point margin. 53% of Washington voters supported the leg-
islature's grant of rights to LGBT couples and 47% opposed. The same-sex
partnerships remained in place. But the story did not end there.
Gay rights groups petitioned under Washington's freedom of informa-
tion laws to have the names of the petition's signatories released to the pub-
lic. The groups planned on publishing the names online in a searchable
database.9 Protect Marriage Washington claimed that the signatories were
expressing core political speech and that their privacy should be protected.1o
On April 28, 2010 the Supreme Court heard oral arguments. The
pro-gay marriage groups offered two state interests that would justify the
disclosures: "(1) preserving the integrity of the electoral process by combat-
ing fraud and promoting transparency and (2) providing information to the
electorate about who supports the petition."" The Justices voted 8-1 to
allow the signatures to be made public.
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence cautioned courts to be "deeply skep-
tical of any assertion that the Constitution, which embraces political trans-
parency, compels States to conceal the identity of persons who seek to
participate in lawmaking through a state-created referendum process."12
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but refused to find any First
Amendment right implicated. After reiterating his continued opposition to
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n 3 (a case in which the court found a right
to anonymous political speech), Justice Scalia combed through U.S. election
history from colonial town meetings to the adoption of the secret ballot by
many states at the end of the 19th century. "The long history of public
legislating and voting," wrote Scalia, "conflicts with plaintiffs claim that
disclosure of petition signature having legislative effect violates the First
Amendment."14
The First Amendment argument was enough to support Justice
Scalia's concurrence where he argued that without a protected right, there
was no reason to question Washington's policy. But Scalia went even fur-
ther. He concluded with a stirring ode to public deliberation:
And it may even be a bad idea to keep petition signatures secret.
There are laws against threats and intimidation; and harsh criti-
cism, short of unlawful action, is a price our people have tradi-
9. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2816 (2011).
10. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
11. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2819.
12. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2829.
13. McIntyre v. Ohio Elect. Cornm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
14. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2836.
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tionally been willing to pay for self-governance. Requiring
people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic
courage, without which democracy is doomed. For my part, I do
not look forward to a society which, thanks to the Supreme
Court, campaigns anonymously and even exercises the direct de-
mocracy of initiative and referendum hidden from public scru-
tiny and protected from the accountability of criticism. This
does not resemble the Home of the Brave.' 5
Justice Scalia expressed similar sentiments two years earlier in his dissent in
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party.6 There,
Washington adopted a primary system wherein candidates were allowed to
identify themselves with whatever party they desired (rather than the party
picking the candidates). The top two vote getters then advanced to a general
election.17 In his dissent, he found no other state interest behind such an
election reform law "except the Washington Legislature's dislike for bright-
colors partisanship, and its desire to blunt the ability of political parties with
noncentrist views to endorse and advocate their own candidates."', This
interest, for Justice Scalia, was not enough.
The two opinions side-by-side show Justice Scalia's preference for a
vigorous and open conception of democratic citizenship. For him, states
have no place watering down partisan politics or shielding people from (le-
gal) reactions to their political actions. He sees partisanship and public dis-
cussion as virtues of American democracy, not problems, and he
approached both attempts to water-down raucous debates with skepticism. I
will explore this idea more in Part III.
B. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen-Campaign Contributions
A year after Doe v. Reed, a federal district court in California reviewed
an as-applied challenge to campaign finance disclosure requirements in the
state. In ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen,19 two groups, The National Organi-
zation for Marriage and ProtectMarriage.com, challenged California's pub-
lic disclosure requirements in relation to the ongoing Proposition 8
controversy. 20 They argued that certain parts of the statute were unconstitu-
15. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2837.
16. Wash. St. Grange v. Wash. St. Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
17. Grange, 552 U.S. at 447.
18. Grange, 552 U.S. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. ProtectMarriage.corn v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
20. California Proposition 8 amended the state constitution by banning same-sex mar-
riages, overturning an earlier state Supreme Court decision granting gay and lesbian
2013] 133
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tional as written and that the disclosure requirements were unconstitutional
as applied to them.21
The plaintiffs relied on the exceptions to the disclosure requirements
that were carved out in Buckley v. Valeo.22 In Buckley, the Supreme Court
upheld parts of a campaign finance law that required parties to disclose
certain donors. An exception could be made, however, if a party could show
a "reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure . .. will subject them
to threats, harassment, or reprisal from either government officials or private
parties."23 The court found such an exception in a case called Brown v.
Socialist Workers.24 There, the Socialist Workers Party provided the court
with evidence of police harassment and surveillance by local, state, and fed-
eral law enforcement.25
The plaintiffs in ProtectMarriage.com argued that they, like the Social-
ist Workers Party, would suffer greatly if their names were made public. As
evidence, they offered up a long, repetitive list of incidents ranging from
silly to shocking. The plaintiffs alleged a number of harms. Some seemed to
stretch the idea of legal harm to its limit, for example: the backlash Miss
California suffered after speaking out against gay marriage at the Miss USA
pageant; comedienne Margaret Cho's derogatory song written about the
Mormon Church; the bad reviews posted online for an ice cream shop
owner who supported Prop 8; Apple withdrawing two iPhone apps that
were deemed anti-gay; and a group of students at UC-Davis being hit with
water balloons.26 The complaint also listed more substantive incidents, in-
cluding a public school teacher harassing a student, several legitimate ac-
counts of vandalism, and unsolicited emails and phone calls to supporters. 27
The district court did not buy the comparison. It found categorical
differences between the plaintiffs and the groups that had been granted ex-
emptions in the past.28 The plaintiffs further argued that the Supreme
Court in Reed implied that large, similarly situated organizations were entn-
Californians the right to marry. See Timeline: Proposition 8, LA TIMES, June 23,
2010, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-prop8-timeline,0,5904222,full.story.
21. ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
22. ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 925, (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976)).
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
24. Brown v. Socialist Workers, 459 U.S. 87, 102 (1982).
25. Brown, 459 U.S. at 100.
26. ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 919-22.
27. ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 917-22.
28. ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 931 ("Plaintiffs do not, indeed cannot, allege
that the movement to recognize marriage in California as existing only between a
man and a woman is vulnerable to the same threats as were socialist and communist
groups, or, for that matter, the NAACP.") (emphasis added).
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tied to as-applied exceptions. Again, the court disagreed. "Justice Alito was
the only Justice that even alluded to the possibility that the Washington
plaintiffs might succeed in their as-applied challenge," the judge wrote, "and
his sweeping assertions as to the strength of Plaintiffs case are premature
given the posture of the case before that court."29 The district court went on
to find that nothing in Reed overrode any of the analysis developed by Buck-
ley and Brown, which indicate that "exemptions were primarily intended to
combat harms suffered by small, persecuted groups."30
III. SCALIA'S CIVIC COURAGE AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
In both Reed and ProtectMarriage. com, courts found that states' inter-
ests in the integrity of their elections outweighed any privacy or associa-
tional interests tied up in anonymity. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in
Reed suggested that political transparency was a constitutional good in it-
self.31 Justice Scalia's concurrence in Reed stressed that Americans have tradi-
tionally tolerated a certain amount of public controversy in the name of
republican government. 32 Judge England in ProtectMarriage.com refused to
grant an exemption to groups that were not the target of intense private and
government harassment. Though neither of the cases actually ruled on the
state of Washington's second rationale in Reed-that providing information
to the public about who supports proposed measures is an important inter-
est in itself -both cases have the effect of making public referenda more
transparent. Both the petition signatures and the sources of campaign fi-
nancing are now accessible to the interested voter. The rulings make voters
in referenda own their votes and interact with the democratic process in a
way that many democratic theorists argue makes for a healthier democracy.
A. Civic Courage in Democratic Theory
Each of these jurists endorses a robust vision of civic republicanism-a
conception of democratic citizenship characterized by, as Scalia put it, civic
courage. 33 This understanding can be traced from republicans like James
29. ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
30. ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
31. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2829 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
("[C]ourts ... should be deeply skeptical of any assertion that the Constitution,
which embraces political transparency, compels States to conceal the identity of per-
sons who seek to participate in lawmaking . . .").
32. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2837 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A]nd harsh criticism, short of
unlawful action, is a price our people have been traditionally willing to pay for self-
governance.").
33. Justice Scalia also used the phrase during oral arguments. In a back and forth with
counsel for the petitioners, Justice Scalia said:
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Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Stuart Mill to contemporary theo-
rists like Hannah Arendt and John Rawls. 4
Modern thinkers have looked at civic courage as an essential compo-
nent of an effective democracy. John Stuart Mill argued, "the duty of vot-
ing, like any other public duty, should be performed under the eye and
criticism of the public" as a means of keeping people honest and public-
minded.35 Mill recognized that the power of the vote was the power over
fellow citizens, and was therefore willing to extend his rationale even to
votes for representatives. 36 He acknowledged that secrecy was sometimes
necessary, but on issues of fundamental importance, the value of trans-
parency outweighed the benefits of anonymity.37 One can see an echo of
this idea in Sotomayor's Reed concurrence, where she encouraged lower
courts to put a thumb on the scale in favor of disclosure.38
Hannah Arendt also called for a heavily public notion of political life.
Writing a century after John Stuart Mill, against the backdrop of a modern
American society, she looked to a classical understanding of a good political
life. Her writings emphasized speech and action as the primary way people
in a political body interact.39 For Arendt a conception of democracy that
consisted of private individuals voting separately and anonymously would
be insufficient.40 She would have individuals meet, as humans and citizens,
in a public political space. That way, citizens can use their shared exper-
And in light of the fact that for the first century of our existence, even
voting was public-you either did it raising your hand or by voice, or later,
you had a ballot that was very visibly red or blue so that people knew which
party you were voting for-the fact is that running a democracy takes a cer-
tain amount ofcivic courage. And the First Amendment does not protect you
from criticism or even nasty phone calls when you exercise your political
rights to legislate or to take part in the legislative process.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-
559) (emphasis added).
34. For a good summary of the development and current state of theories of civic repub-
licanism, see Will Kymlicka, Citizenship Theory, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHI-
LOsOPY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2002).
35. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 355 (John Gray ed., 1991).
36. Id. at 354 ("[T]he exercise of any political function, either as an elector or as a
representative, is power over others.").
37. Id. at 353 ("Nor can it be reasonably maintained that no cases are conceivable, in
which secret voting is preferable to public. But I must contend that these cases, in
affairs of a political character, are the exception, not the rule.").
38. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2829.
39. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 176 (1958); see also James A. Gard-
ner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 927, 939
(2011).
40. Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves, Hannah Arendt, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Jul 27, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/arendt/#CitPubSph.
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iences as well as their differences as raw material in a democratic decision
making process.4'
John Rawls also saw the benefit of public accountability and action
when dealing with fundamental rights. "Citizens," Rawls wrote, "must be
able . . . to present to one another publicly acceptable reasons for their
political views in cases raising fundamental political questions . . . we must
justify our use of our corporate and coercive political power, where those
essential matters are at stake, in the light of public reason." 42 Public reason-
ing, for Rawls, was a common space that citizens with different ideologies
and religions could use to make decisions about civic issues. The floor of the
Senate (at least in some romantic conceptions) is an example of a site of
public reasoning at work. Rawls was focused on fundamental questions of
how to organize society, rather than day-to-day appropriations bills. Public
referenda about the rights of minorities would fall under the former cate-
gory, and would therefore be sites where public reasoning and justifications
are paramount.
Contemporary democratic theorists like Amy Gutmann have also
identified publicity as a fundamental requirement of deliberative democ-
racy.43 In these theorists' ideal democracies, citizens are expected to partici-
pate in the public sphere, and their actions are expected to be sincere,
independent, and public-minded."
The idea of civic courage also occasionally appears in Supreme Court
opinions-most notably Justices Brandeis and Holmes' dissents in a string
of First Amendment cases in the early twentieth century. In the First
Amendment context, Brandeis and Holmes were championing the tolerance
of radical political speech in the name of democratic decision making. Bran-
deis, in his dissent in Whitney v. Caifornia, wrote what one legal scholar
called the most important words ever written about the First Amendment. 45
In the dissent, Brandeis, like Scalia, points out that Americans have had a
high tolerance for dissent and even disorder in the name of liberty.4 6 Bran-
41. Id.
42. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 91 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
43. AMY GUTMANN & FRANK THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 95
(1996) ("The reasons that officials and citizens give to justify political actions, and
the information necessary to assess those reasons, should be public.").
44. For a good discussion of republicanism and the problems of anonymity, see Gardner,
supra note 39. Sherman Clark also provides a useful evaluation of the effect of this
same issue on the citizen voter. Sherman J. Clark, Ennobling Direct Democracy, 78 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1341, 1343-44 (2007); Sherman J. Clark, The Character of Direct
Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1341 (2004).
45. Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis
Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653, 668 (1988).
46. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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deis' reading of the First Amendment is one in which, "fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.... To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that
serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. "4 Serious evil, for Brandeis,
translated into an exceptionally high standard, one in which the fate of the
state itself was implicated. Like Mill and unlike Gutmann, Brandeis saw
civic courage in this instance as a prerequisite for free society, rather than a
tool for coming to the right public policy decisions.48
Legal commentators have also discussed the complicated relationship
between anonymity and democratic institutions. James A. Gardner notes
that anonymity functions in a variety of nuanced and context-dependent
ways in the political arena.49 In some instances, anonymity might allow vot-
ers to express deeply held convictions, even if they are unpopular. Honesty
and diversity are certainly virtues in a democratic institution. But in the
context of minority rights, anonymity can be problematic. Anonymity can
provide cover for prejudices and biases. And for a committed civic republi-
can it can muddy up the electoral process, blinding voters to certain politi-
cal realities. Gardner points out that, "anonymity frames issues by erecting a
barrier between individuals and the objects of their attention; it invites the
anonymous to think of themselves as distinct from others who their behav-
ior might affect."50 He cites research by psychologists, who label the phe-
nomenon "deindividuation" and link it to the type of antisocial behavior
exhibited by mobs.51 In this context, voters might feel more comfortable
expressing homophobia.
The observations of these theorists and jurists have found support in
empirical studies. An important parallel can be seen in the so-called Bradley
effect (also known as the Wilder effect), where African Americans receive
more support in polls than they do at actual elections. Though there is some
47. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376.
48. Blasi, supra note 45, at 675.
Brandeis was an idealist, but he was not a perfectionist. When he speaks of
the benefits of political participation, his major concern is with the preser-
vation of freedom. He does not claim that participatory democracy pro-
duces the wisest policies on a day-to-day basis. Nor does he assert, though
he may well have believed, that regular and active political participation is a
necessary feature of a personally fulfilling life. To Brandeis, public discus-
sion is a "duty." It is a duty because political liberty is a fragile condition,
easily lost when its institutions and traditions fall into the hands of inert
people.
Id. (citation omitted).
49. Gardner, supra note 39, at 930.
50. Gardner, supra note 39, at 954.
51. Id. at 954 n.140.
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debate about the continued existence of the effect, political scientists have
identified a number of elections where the phenomenon clearly occurred.52
The discrepancy between a voter's public representations and private
prejudices is exactly the kind of problem that concerned Mill, Arendt,
Rawls, and Gutmann. In the theorists' terms, citizens are less prone to in-
fecting public decision making with private prejudices when they are bravely
arguing face to face than when they are anonymously legislating as a mob.
B. Civic Courage at Work in the Cases
While Reed and ProtectMarriage.com deal with ballot initiatives and
donor disclosures rather than voting itself, they still encourage civic courage
in the democratic process. Both cases limit the level of anonymity citizens
can claim when acting on important political issues.
The respondents in Reed argued that one of the state's interests was to
provide the electorate with information. The state's argument was that dis-
closure would offer "insight into whether support for holding a vote comes
predominantly from particular interest groups" and would "[allow] Wash-
ington voters to engage in discussion of referred measures with persons
whose acts secured the election and suspension of state law."" Justice Scalia
did not address this argument explicitly, but his concurrence pointed to a
long of history public accountability. He cited figures like Justice Story
praising the transparency of legislative action.54 Justice Scalia also sang the
praises of civic courage, both at oral argument and in his opinion.
Only Justice Alito, in concurrence, and Justice Thomas, in dissent,
addressed the validity of a state interest in providing information about peti-
tion signers, and both found it unpersuasive. Justice Thomas wrote, "People
are intelligent enough to evaluate the merits of a referendum without know-
ing who supported it. Thus, just as this informational interest did not jus-
tify the Ohio law in McIntyre, it does not justify applying the PRA to
referendum petitions."" Justice Alito pushed the argument to the extreme
52. Compare Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, Implicit Bias, Election '08, and the
Myth ofa Post-RacialAmerica, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 659, 705-09 (2010) (finding
evidence of the Bradley effect in the 2008 election), with Daniel J. Hopkins, No
More Wilder Effect, Never a Whitman Effect: When and Why Polls Mislead about Black
and Female Candidates, 71 J. POL. 769, 770 (2009) (finding the Bradley effect has
slowly disappeared in American Politics).
53. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2824 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Brief of
Respondent Sam Reed at 58, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2011) (No. 09-559).).
54. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
55. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2843 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas was also the only
Justice to come out against disclosure in Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 130
S. Ct. 876, 980 (2010). The eight-Justice consensus on disclosure suggests this sort
of civic courage has broad appeal on the Court.
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and reasoned that if the state could provide names and addresses, then it
could also provide "race, religion, political affiliation, sexual orientation,
ethnic background, and interest-group memberships." 56 He also worried
that the information provided could lead to "names of their spouses and
neighbors, their telephone numbers, directions to their homes, pictures of
their homes, information about their homes . . . any information posted to
a social networking site, and newspaper articles in which their names ap-
peared."5 7 Justices Thomas and Alito both believe that any state interest in
providing information about signers is outweighed by the demands of the
First Amendment.
Some civil libertarians may share the concerns of Justices Alito and
Thomas.5 8 They might be uncomfortable with the collateral issues like chil-
ling of speech or invasion of privacy. The Supreme Court has recognized
that some regulations that have a chilling effect on free speech work against
the purposes of the First Amendment.5 Disclosure of personal information
is an activity that has traditionally implicated both the First Amendment
and a right to privacy.60
Others argue that such disclosure runs against the goals of deliberative
democracy-that disclosure will in fact dissuade people from participating.
In a note arguing that that legislatures should amend their public records
laws after Reed, Karen Cullinane writes: "No matter how repugnant a view
may seem, shaming the person who holds it discourages citizens from par-
ticipating in a political process open to everyone-not just those holding a
viewpoint held by a majority or even just those with the courage to act on
their views."6' Cullinane points to a Wall Street Journal poll which showed
that three out of five people would hesitate before involving themselves in a
ballot-issue committee if their identifying information was made public.
She argues that this shows a chilling effect and somehow "[prevents] fellow
citizens from better understanding the true extent of a view's acceptance in
wider society." 62 This worry is a persistent one in First Amendment law. A
56. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2824 (Alito, J., concurring).
57. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2825 (Alito, J., concurring).
58. Letter from the ACLU of Wash., as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Appellants in
Doe v. Reed, to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Sept. 25, 2009), http://
aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2009-09-25-ACLU]ol]%20Amicus%20
Ltr.pdf.
59. See Robert A. Sedler, Self-Censorship and the First Amendment, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 13, 21 (2011).
60. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 527-31 (2006).
61. Karen Cullinane, Protecting Anonymous Expression: The Internet's Role in Washington
State's Disclosure Laws and the Direct Democracy Process, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
947, 958 (2011).
62. Id at 960.
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similar concern motivated carve outs in disclosure laws for persecuted
groups.63
But as Judge England noted in ProtectMarriage.com, these disclosure
cases are categorically different from cases involving the NAACP in the seg-
regated South or the Socialist Workers Party during the Red Scare. Whereas
those groups had little chance of political success and were the targets of
organized harassment, "here, Plaintiffs orchestrated a massive movement to
amend the California Constitution. Proponents of the initiative were suc-
cessful in their endeavor, raising nearly $30 million, securing 52.3% of the
vote and convincing over seven million voters to support Proposition 8."61
In these cases, the people being outed are the people who have until recently
made up a national majority-the groups who have successfully passed gay
marriage bans in more than half of the U.S. states. In Washington, this
contingent managed 47% of the referendum vote. 65 And they are certainly
represented in state and national legislatures. Eighteen members of Wash-
ington's Senate and thirty-five members of its House opposed the underly-
ing bill, Senate Bill 5688.66
Most importantly, the historical contexts of the cases are incompara-
ble. In the segregated South, African Americans and civil rights activists
were being killed, often with the complicity of local law enforcement.
Groups like Protect Marriage Washington, on the other hand, share their
policy goals with a major national political party platform.67 A world domi-
nated by systematic lynching is categorically different from one punctuated
by sporadic vandalism and bad press. Different social realities demand dif-
ferent applications of legal principles.
63. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958); Brown v. Socialist Workers,
459 U.S. 87, 102 (1982).
64. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914, 929 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
65. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2816 (2011).
66. See S.B. 5688, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009), available at http://apps.leg.wa.
gov/documents/billdocs/2009-I0/PdflBills/Senateo20Bills/5688.pdf.
67. Under the "Preserving Our Values" plank of the Republican Party's 2008 national
platform, the platform in place during these cases, the "Preserving Traditional Mar-
riage" section reads:
Because our children's future is best preserved within the traditional under-
standing of marriage, we call for a constitutional amendment that fully pro-
tects marriage as a union of a man and a woman, so that judges cannot
make other arrangements equivalent to it. In the absence of a national
amendment, we support the right of the people of the various states to
affirm traditional marriage through state initiatives.
2008 Republican Party Platform: Preserving Traditional Marriage, THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 1, 2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.
php?pid=78545.
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Furthermore, when the public participates in direct democracy, why
should the public do so from a sterile position, free from the consequences
of their actions? As Scalia made clear in Reed, this type of ballot initiative is
more than a public opinion poll.6 8 It is political action that will have a
direct effect on the rights and liberties of other citizens, exactly the type of
high stakes deliberation over fundamental rights where the mob mentality
that Garner described is most dangerous. Civil rights are the type of consti-
tutional decision that Rawls thought required certain preconditions, includ-
ing appeal to public reason. Even if we assume that some degree of privacy is
necessary for citizens to form opinions and deliberate, it does not follow
that they must be allowed to actually legislate anonymously.6 9 And financial
disclosure, as the Court has also held, does not in itself prevent anyone from
speaking or voting. 70 Transparency in both of these instances forces voters
to, as Arendt might say, interact face to face in shared political space. It
encourages voters to think of themselves as individual citizens, with skin in
the game and responsibility for the treatment of their fellow citizens.
Some have rightly worried about the power of the Internet to aggre-
gate and disseminate identifying information.71 The groups who wanted to
publish names in Washington did not do themselves any favors by choosing
the vaguely menacing titles "Know Thy Neighbor" and "WhoSigned." It is
not difficult to imagine maps and databases being abused and signatories
being intimidated or their property vandalized.
For their part, the organizers of these groups have voiced a distinctly
legal and democratic goal. Tom Lang, a director of one of the groups, pub-
licly stated his organization's aim as follows: "for social change to happen,
there has to be a shaming part."72 He said the group's goal was discussion,
rather than intimidation, and that he was, "trying to get you to understand
that if you're going to try to take away my rights I want you to know what
you're doing . . . ."73 Indeed, as Chesa Boudin points out in a student note
68. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2833 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Gardner notes that "[P]rivacy and anonymity are not the same.... A solitary walk
on the beach or a private weekend in the country may afford the liberal citizen all the
opportunity he or she needs to reason individually about his or her beliefs and val-
ues .... " Gardner, supra note 39, at 940-41.
70. Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010).
71. See generally Gardner, supra note 39. Cullinane makes an argument for interpreting
Washington's PRA in light of the technology available when it was passed: "The
essential values currently animating disclosure policies should not have radically
changed from those deemed important during the decades leading up to and at the
passage of the PRA. . . .Technology, on the other hand, has changed, and in a way
that severely distorts the purpose of the PRA . . . ." Cullinane, supra note 61, at 976.





in the Yale Law Journal, the distinction between speech and lawmaking is
crucial here. 4 In the same way that transparency allows elected officials to
deal with complex issues and arrive at informed decisions in the formal
legislative process, it guides and tempers direct democracy.
Some interested in LGBT rights might also be wary because anonym-
ity has been traditionally used as a shield for members of persecuted
groups. 75 The Internet, for example, allowed lesbians and gay men to build
community and support without having to out themselves to their families
and coworkers.76 In the broader context of a patriarchal and heteronorma-
tive society, anonymity is useful because it shields minority groups from a
hegemonic state. Others might be critical of oppressed groups adopting
means that might themselves be criticized as oppressive or inherently
biased.77
But the gay rights movement has made impressive gains in the last
thirty years. Now many gay rights activists consider coming out to be one of
the most powerful political statements gay and lesbian Americans can
make.78 A majority of Americans support legalized same-sex marriage.7 9 The
recent political victories in states like New York, Washington, and Maine
74. Chesa Boudin, Note, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History ofAnony-
mous Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 2140, 2178 (2011).
75. See Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, and Cyberspace,
38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 199, 202 (2003).
76. Id. at 162.
77. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
159-70 (1989). MacKinnon labels the state-and consequently the law-as inher-
ently male. Id. at 160-65. She considers the traditional understanding of civil liber-
ties, wherein the state doesn't act in the name of individual freedom, to be
problematic from a feminist standpoint. Id. MacKinnon would likely reject the civic
republican conception of citizenship as a good choice for oppressed groups. That
conception embraces a classical liberal conception of the state and the citizen's rela-
tionship to it.
78. Indeed, this strategy seems to be wildly agreed upon. The outspoken activist Dan
Savage and the libertarian Andrew Sullivan both have advocated coming out as the
most effective way to advance gay rights. Interview by BigThink with Andrew Sulli-
van, http://bigthink.com/andrewsullivan (see the "It Gets Better-But Not Through
Politics" segment); Dan Savage, The Single Most Important Political Action a Gay
Person Can Take SLOG (May 14, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://slog.thestranger.com/
slog/archives/2011/05/1 4 /the-single-most-important-political-action-a-gay-person-
can-take. See Richard Socarides, Rob Portman and His Brave, Gay Son, THE NEW
YORKER (March 15, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/
2013/03/rob-portman-and-his-brave-gay-son.html#ixzz2Nhz4rUQK ("Will
Portman proved, once again, that the most powerful political act any gay person can
take is coming out.").
79. Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Marriage,
GALLUP, (May, 20 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147662/First-Time-Majority
-Americans-Favor-Legal-Gay-Marriage.aspx.
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will likely be viewed as a tipping point in the years to come.80 All of these
indicators suggest that the LGBT rights movement is at a place where it
should embrace this courageous conception of citizenship.
Many argue that encouraging civic courage is a good in itself.81 But
beyond its inherent virtue, embracing this conception of democratic citizen-
ship would have other benefits. Issues around LGBT rights, and especially
the recognition of gay marriage, are highly polarized. Embracing a concep-
tion of citizenship that involves civic courage rather than anonymity has the
potential to move the political debate forward. The next section will look at
the phenomenon of polarization. It will then examine American attitudes
toward the LGBT community and suggest how structuring public referenda
around a robust conception of civic republicanism could alter those
attitudes.
IV. POLARIZATION
A. Theories of Polarization
Polarization is a phenomenon in which a majority of subjects express
extreme support or opposition for an issue. 82 In most circumstances, peo-
ple's preferences for everything from peanut butter to tax policy follow a
standard bell curve. A majority of people will find themselves in the middle,
in moderate positions. This type of distribution is sometimes called
unimodal because it produces only one mode-the statistical term for the
value that appears most often-at the top of the curve. If a group is po-
larized, that means that the bell curve is inverted, so that a majority of
subjects identify with one extreme or another.83 A polarized distribution will
produce a bimodal "U" shaped curve. This type of distribution has two
modes, one at either extreme.8 4 The so-called "Culture Wars" that have
80. See A Festive Mood in Maine as Same-Sex Marriage Becomes Legal, N.Y.TIMEs, Dec.
29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/us/same-sex-marriage-becomes-
legal-in-maine.html?_r=0; Katharine Q. Seelye, Last Holdout in New England, Rhode
Island Weighs Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/24/us/politics/rhode-island-weighs-gay-marriage-as-the-last-holdout-in-
new-england.html.
81. See supra Part III.A.
82. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71,
74-76 (2000).
83. ALAN J. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, POIARI-




dominated news headlines for the last few decades are often framed as a
product of polarization around certain social issues. 5
James A. Thomson of the RAND Corporation has argued that,
among other things, polarization inhibits political discourse and limits the
efficacy of sound policy analysis in politics.86 As Cass Sunstein has noted,
polarization can be dangerous to democratic decision making."1 For exam-
ple, in a controlled experiment a group of jury members asked to place a
dollar amount on a plaintiffs damages consistently arrived at a higher num-
ber than an individual juror would have before deliberation.88 This means
that if we took the average of each juror's pre-deliberation estimates of dam-
ages, the number would be smaller than the amount actually awarded after
the jurors interacted with one another. In other words, when members of a
homogenous insular group deliberate, they tend to shift towards more ex-
treme positions.
In this way, polarization negates the positive effects of group delibera-
tion-the sort of marketplace-of-ideas model articulated by John Stuart
Mill in On Liberty"> or the additional check on the tyranny of the majority
articulated by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 70.90 In the context of
LGBT rights, polarization has the added danger of demonizing and dehu-
manizing a minority. General anxiety or ignorance about the LGBT com-
munity can fester and become outright hostility. Sunstein, though he
remains ambivalent about whether enclaves moving to extremes is ulti-
mately good or bad for policy making, does worry about unjustified extrem-
ism and fanaticism.9i
85. For an empirical analysis of public polarization and hot button issues, see Paul
DiMaggio, John Evans & Bethan Bryson, Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become
More Polarized?, 102 AM. J. Soc. 690, 715 (1996) (finding some evidence that
Americans are polarized around the issues of abortion and poverty, but little evidence
to show clear polarization around many other social issues); John H. Evans, Have
Americans'Attitudes Become More Polarized?-An Update, 84 Soc. Sci. Q. 71, 77
(2009) (Finding evidence of popular polarization around abortion and issues relating
to sexuality).
86. See James A. Thomson, A House Divided: Polarization and Its Effect on RAND,
RAND CORPORATION, 2010, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
occasional-papers/2010/RANDOP291.pdf.
87. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 76 ("[D]eliberating enclaves can be breeding grounds
both for the development of unjustly suppressed views and for unjustified extrem-
ism, indeed fanaticism.").
88. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 95.
89. See Mill, supra note 35.
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 357 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
("The differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties in that department of the
government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote
deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority.").
91. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 76.
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The historian and social critic Gertrude Himmelfarb has argued that
polarization around these issues signals a larger rift in society. 92 She proposes
that during the twentieth century, decadent liberal attitudes supplanted
more traditional Victorian values, and that the two systems are not only
incompatible, but are responsible for some of the most heated political
clashes of the last fifty years. The dividing line, she suggests, might be the
most important aspect of contemporary society.9 3
Himmelfarb bemoans the fact that "alternative lifestyles that were
frowned upon by polite society not so long ago are now not only tolerated
but given equal status with traditional lifestyles."94 She claims that Victor-
nian "manners and morals" that were once prized are now regarded as "puri-
tanical and hypocritical." 95 She sees the current polarization in America as a
backlash against the mid-century revolutions in culture, sexuality, and polit-
ics.96 And while Himmelfarb does recognize a certain amount of heteroge-
neity and overlap, she insists that two distinct cultures exist. Even though
people might hold a few idiosyncratic beliefs, "in general, there is a com-
mon set of mind, a confluence of values and beliefs, that locates most peo-
ple, most of the time, for most purposes, within one or the other culture."97
Where Himmelfarb looked to large cultural phenomena to explain po-
larization, others have looked to individual level psychology. Some of the
psychological mechanisms that have been identified include social compari-
son and limited argument pools. Social comparison is a term that describes
when people move their judgments in order to "preserve their image to
others and their image to themselves."" A limited argument pool factors in
because people choose the best argument from those around them, and
when group members are already inclined in a certain direction, the availa-
ble arguments are all skewed in that same direction. The result is the group
as a whole moving towards an extreme point and pulling new members with
92. GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, Two CULTURES: A SEARCHING EXAMINA-
TION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE AFTERMATH OF OUR CULTURAL REVOLUTION
117-18 (1999). Notably, Himmelfarb rejects the civic republicanism that I am
championing here as a cure for the rift that she sees. Instead, she would focus on
cultivating individual virtue. Id. at 44.
93. Himmelfarb writes: "In some respects, [the cultural polarization] is even more divi-
sive than the class polarization that Karl Marx saw as the crucial fact of life under
capitalism." Id. at 117-18.
94. Id. at 118.
95. Id
96. She sees it as the rise of a counter-counterculture: "If the dominant culture is the heir
of the counterculture, the dissident culture represents a counter-counterculture, a
reaction against the increasingly prevalent and increasingly 'looser' system of
morals." Id. at 124.
97. Id at 126.
98. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 89.
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them.9 9 Both of these mechanisms could potentially be undermined by the
public mindset discussed in Part II. An argument pool that is made up of
brave citizens of all stripes is less likely to be small and homogenous. Citi-
zens would have a hard time avoiding opposing viewpoints and, perhaps
more importantly, an easy time seeing the fellow citizens who might be
affected by a policy.
Other psychological tendencies also contribute to group polarization.
Physical spacing reduces polarization, and a sense of common fate and soli-
darity tend to increase it.ico Importantly in the LGBT context, the existence
of an "outgroup" also tends to increase the intensity of polarization. o As a
matter of fact, real or perceived group membership is a key part of groups
that move to extremes. And as Himmelfarb argued, issues like gay rights
split down a clear line, with identifiable groups on both sides. Thus "Cul-
ture War" issues, like gay rights and abortion, are the types of controversies
that lend themselves to intense polarization. One way to explain the evi-
dence of popular polarization around these issues is that people on either
side of these issues find easy ways to define and distinguish themselves from
their opponents-for example age, religion, and religiosity.
That is not to say polarization always facilitates oppression. Like the
historical use of anonymity by the LGBT community, polarization and iso-
lated argument pools have sometimes been useful for minorities. 10 2 Like-
minded groups allow for the development of ideas and for the voices of
traditionally silenced members to be heard. Sunstein explains:
Even if group polarization is at work-perhaps because group
polarization is at work-enclaves can provide a wide range of
social benefits, not least because they greatly enrich the social
argument pool. In fact, the First Amendment right of expressive
association should be understood in precisely these terms. Ac-
cording protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is
especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity
and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the
majority.0 3
But, once again, the LGBT movement has moved past the point where
taking advantage of insular groups is useful. The LGBT community has
99. Id. at 89-90.
100. Id. at 91.
101. Id. In other words, when a group has another group to define themselves against,
they emphasize distinctions.
102. Id. at 111.
103. Id.
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built alliances and changed enough minds to garner the support of a major-
ity of Americans. Gay and lesbian voices now have a prominent place in
popular media, blogs, academia, think tanks, and other deliberating bodies.
B. Empirical Studies of Polarization
Empirical studies over the past few decades have confirmed that the
country's politics have become more polarized, but social scientists disagree
about the nature and extent of the polarization. Most political scientists
seem to agree that both party elites and the parties themselves have become
more liberal and conservative.1 0 4
There is disagreement, however, about the extent to which polariza-
tion exists. Morris Fiorina and Samuel Abrams, for example, have argued
that the average voter today is no more ideologically sophisticated or po-
larized than the average voter a generation ago.105 Fiorina and Abrams say
that Himmelfarb's thesis is largely unsupported by empirical evidence, and
that voters' identification with relativism or absolutism had little correlation
with their political preferences. o6 Fiorina and Abrams have also challenged
the assertion made by Sunstein and others that Americans are becoming
geographically polarized-that liberals and conservatives are moving into
cities and neighborhoods of like-minded people to the detriment of the
general body politic.107
Others have pushed back against this view. Alan Abramowitz and Kyle
Saunders have shown that when average citizens who are relatively well edu-
cated and politically engaged are surveyed, they show much more evidence
of polarization than poorly educated and disengaged citizens.'0 8 They also
argue that Americans are becoming more geographically polarized. The av-
erage margin of victory in presidential elections, for example, has increased
over time, and voters from states that consistently vote for Republican can-
didates were much more likely to display a number of predictable
characteristics. 109
104. See Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, Political Polarization in the American
Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 563 (2008); Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman,
Partisans Without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public
Opinion, 114 Am. J. Soc. 408, 410 (2008).
105. Fiorina & Abrams, supra note 104, at 584.
106. Id. at 569.
107. Id. at 576-77. But see John Tierney, Op-Ed., Must We Talk?, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/opinion/07tierney.html.
108. Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Is Polarization a Myth?, 70 J. POL. 542, 545
(2008).
109. Id. at 549.
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Even if we doubt the existence of strong polarization among average
voters generally, gay marriage (along with abortion) seems to be one area
where the parties themselves acknowledge the issue as a helpful tool. 10 For
example, gay rights continue to be an important campaign issue, especially
for Republican candidates. George W. Bush's 2004 reelection campaign
made a federal marriage amendment part of the national discussion.'
Some political scientists have called his re-election the most polarized in
modern political history.112 In the 2012 Republican primaries, at least one
candidate aired ads declaring his opposition to gays serving openly in the
military and his support for exclusively heterosexual marriage. 1 3
Though the evidence of general polarization in the electorate is mixed,
there is at least some empirical and anecdotal evidence that the public is
polarized around abortion and sexual politics.
C Polarization and LGBT Rights
What do the rulings in Reed and ProtectMarriage.com have to do with
polarization over issues of LGBT rights? By upholding a state's power to
make ballot signatories and campaign donors public and by adopting a high
threshold to win an exemption, the rulings force groups working against
expanding LGBT rights to, as Scalia said in Reed, "stand up in public for
their political acts."" 4 For advocates of renewed civic republicanism and
others who are hopeful that the political process can provide solutions for
controversial issues like gay marriage, there is reason to believe that this
general rule of transparency will allow for more heterogeneous deliberation
and movement toward a widely accepted solution. Depolarization can take
place either when people's sense of belonging to a distinct group is ques-
tioned or when new group members with whom they identify introduce
conflicting arguments into the pool."' For proponents of expanded LGBT
110. Linda C. McClain, Red Versus Blue (and Purple) States and the Same-Sex Marriage
Debate: From Values to Polarization to Common Ground?, 77 UMKC L. REV. 417,
418-19 (2008).
111. David Stout, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 24,
2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/politics/24CND-GAY.html.
112. Alan 1. Abramowitz & Walter J. Stone, The Bush Effect: Polarization, Turnout, and
Activism in the 2004 Presidential Election, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 141, 141
(2006). But see JAMES W. CEASER & ANDREW E. BUSCH, RED OVER BLUE: THE
2004 ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2005) (downplaying the role of hot-
button social issues).
113. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Perry Ad Focuses on Gays and Christianity, THE CAUCUS (Dec.
7, 2011), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/perry-ad-focuses-on-gays-
and-christianity/.
114. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2011).
115. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 93.
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rights, there is reason to believe that public debate will move people towards
more LGBT friendly positions or at least stem the tide of state constitu-
tional amendments banning the recognition of same-sex couples.
Heavily polarized issues tend to stagnate. Abortion, for example, is one
of the few issues where evidence of polarization is almost universally ac-
knowledged. 116 And, since Roe v. Wade, abortion has been a political foot-
ball. Both parties use abortion as a wedge issue and state laws often flip back
and forth as different parties take control of the legislatures.1 17 Reed and
ProtectMarriage.com remove one possible barrier. Anonymity encourages po-
larization." By disclosing donors and signatories, groups like Protect Mar-
riage expose their members to opposing viewpoints. In fact, a number of the
incidents that the plaintiffs in ProtectMarriage.com listed as evidence of past
harassment involved picketing, boycotts, and other protests." 9 The court
refused to find that these amounted to the sort of "serious and widespread
harassment" that would warrant an exemption. In fact, the court pointed
out: "the acts which Plaintiffs complain are mechanisms relied upon, both
historically and lawfully, to voice dissent."120
These types of dissent are part of a public discourse that proponents of
deliberative democracy hope produce the best possible outcomes. Cass Sun-
stein ended his survey of the causes and effects of polarization with a plea
for "ensuring that deliberation occurs within a large and heterogeneous
public sphere, and for guarding against a situation in which like-minded
people wall themselves off from alternatives perspectives."121 And John Stu-
art Mill, who advocated that every vote should be a public vote, also called
for a large and varied public sphere: "it is only by tag collision of adverse
opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being
supplied. "l22
Encouraging public discussion might also promote movement on the
issue because it would force opposing groups to use a common language. In
their book Red Families v. Blue Families, Naomi Cahn and June Carbone
116. Fiorina & Abrams, supra note 104, at 569.
117. At the federal level, the so called Mexico City rule, allowing foreign aid funds to be
used by clinics that provide information about abortion, has changed like clockwork
with the election of different parties to the presidency. See Peter Baker, Obama
Reverses Rules on U.S. Abortion Aid N.Y. TiMEs, Jan 23, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/01/24/us/politics/24obama.html.
118. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 101 ("Group polarization can intensify if people are
speaking anonymously and if attention is drawn, through one or another means, to
group membership.").
119. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919-22 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
120. ProtectMarriage.com, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 934.
121. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 105.
122. Mill, supra note 35, at 25.
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make exactly this point.123 When groups become polarized in issues that
they see involve moral absolutes, like gay marriage and abortion, they be-
come especially entrenched. Cracking polarization around these issues in-
volves changing the discussion.124 Cahn and Carbone argue, "[genuine]
engagement also requires a recognition that leadership couched in terms of
one paradigm may needlessly antagonize the other." 2 5 In fact, studies show
that how gay marriage is framed makes a difference in how groups react to
proposed legislation.12 6 Cahn and Carbone advocate movement forward
based on state-by-state electoral politics, rather than federal litigation, a de-
cidedly civic republican approach.127
Those of us who favor extending legal rights like marriage and em-
ployment discrimination protection to the LGBT community should ap-
plaud the outcomes of Reed and ProtectMarriage.com because they facilitate
continued acceptance of the LGBT community. Americans have become
more accepting of the LGBT community over the past thirty years.1 28 In
fact, in 2011, for the first time ever, a Gallup poll found a majority of
Americans in favor of gay marriage. 29 From the early 1990s onward, the
percentage of Americans who believe that sexual relations between two
adults of the same sex are "always wrong" has dropped precipitously. 1o
Political scientists who have studied this dramatic shift in opinion
have come up with a few different theories to explain the change. One pop-
ular theory is called the Contact Hypothesis.'3' This theory has also been
used to describe relations between black and white citizens. In the context
of race relations, research tends to show that the contact between groups
functions in complicated ways. For example, in communities where schools
were desegregated, racist attitudes among white students remained relatively
constant, even after they began to have daily interactions with black stu-
123. NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARI-
ZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010).
124. Cass Sunstein explains why simply bringing more information to a debate like gay
marriage together isn't enough: "when people have a fixed view of some highly sali-
ent public issue, they are likely to have heard a wide range of arguments in various
directions, producing a full argument pool, and additional discussion is not likely to
produce movement." Sunstein, supra note 82, at 93.
125. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 123, at 3.
126. See, e.g., Vincent Price, Lilach Nir & Joseph N. Cappella, Framing Public Discussion
of Gay Civil Unions, 69 PUB. OP. Q. 179 (2005).
127. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 123, at 7.
128. See generally Paul Brewer, The Shifling Foundations of Public Opinion About Gay
Rights, 65 J. OF POL. 1208 (2003).
129. Newport, supra note 79.
130. Brewer, supra note 128, at 1208-09.
131. L. Marvin Overby & Jay Barth, Contact, Community Context, and Public Attitudes
Toward Gay Men and Lesbians, 34 POLITY 433, 435 (2002).
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dents.132 The theory works a little more neatly in describing the relationship
between straight and gay subjects. Jay Barth, L. Marvin Overby, and Scott
H. Huffmon looked at attitudes of residents of South Carolina in 2006,
when the state was voting on its own same-sex marriage amendment.133
They found that certain forms of interpersonal contact have a dramatic,
though not definitive, effect on attitudes about gay rights.' 4 Citizens with
more personal contact with gays and lesbians are consistently more ac-
cepting of measures that promote equal treatment in areas like employment,
military service, and adoption rights.13
Voters that remain opposed to expanding LGBT rights tend to have a
number of traits in common-they tend to go to church one or more times
a week, identify as fundamentalist Christian, and live in distinct geographic
areas. 36Problematically, they are also less likely to know anyone who is gay
or lesbian.' 3 And as earlier researchers have noted, this presents a paradox
that reinforces polarization: "Not only does contract tend to foster greater
acceptance of gay men generally, but in addition heterosexuals with already
positive attitudes . . . are more likely than others to experience contact,"
because gay and lesbian citizens are more likely to interact with those who
aren't hostile to their lifestyles.'"3 Contact is especially important because
studies show that even increased political knowledge does not have a dis-
cernible effect on attitudes toward gay rights.139 In fact, increased exposure
to gay and lesbian citizens, both through media and through friends and
family members coming out, has been one of the most important drivers of
the dramatic change in attitudes towards LGBT rights in the last few
decades. 140
Insofar as the rule emerging from Reed and ProtectMarriage.com pro-
motes interaction between citizens, we can be optimistic that it will acceler-
ate the trend of public support for same-sex marriage, employment
protection, and other LGBT rights issues. As Sunstein notes, the most effec-
132. Id.
133. Jay Barth, L. Marvin Overby & Scott H. Huffmon, Community Context, Personal
Contact, and Support for an Anti-Gay Rights Referendum, 62 POL. REs. Q. 355
(2009).
134. Id.
135. Overby & Barth, supra note 131, at 456.
136. Id. at 451.
137. Barth et al., supra note 133, at 360.
138. Gergory M. Herek & Eric K. Glunt, Interpersonal Contact and Heterosexuals' Atti-
tudes Toward Gay Men: Results from a National Survey, 30 J. OF SEx RES. 239, 243
(1993).
139. Paul Brewer, Values, Political Knowledge, and Public Opinion about Gay Rights: A
Framing Based Account, 67 PuB. OPINION Q. 173, 174 (2003).
140. Barth et al., supra note 133, at 361; see also Brewer, supra note 128, at 1217.
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tive messenger to counter a polarized group is someone like them.'4 ' So
while the types of protest that we saw in ProtectMarraige.com undoubtedly
have some effect, we should hope for more interactions like the ones at least
nominally called goals by KnowThyNeighbor.com-interaction with neigh-
bors, church members, teammates, and family.
V. LGBT RIGHTS AND REFERENDA AFTER DOE
Another good reason to promote transparent public debate about pub-
lic referenda is that they are particularly dangerous for minority groups. In
Federalist 10, James Madison voiced a concern common among his peers:
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its rul-
ing passion or interest both the public good and the rights of
other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights
against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to
preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then
the great object to which our inquiries are directed.14 2
Alexis de Tocqueville made similar observations in Democracy in America
decades later.'4 3 Today at least twenty-seven states have direct democracy
mechanisms like Washington-a mechanism largely rejected in the found-
ing era due to a deep (and prescient) distrust of mob democracy. 44
Madison and Tocqueville's suspicions have been put to the test in the
last decade by a few different political scientists. In the late 1990s, Barbara
S. Gamble examined thirty years of initiatives and popular referenda across
the country. She found that initiatives that restricted civil rights for minor-
ity groups were successful over three-quarters of the time while public refer-
enda as a whole were only approved about a third of the time. 4 5 Her
conclusions were questioned by a duo of political scientists a year later.146
141. Sunstein, supra note 82, at 93-94.
142. THE FEDERALIST No. Io, at 50 (ames Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
143. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 296 (Gerald E. Bevan, trans.,
Penguin Edition, 2003) ("1 am not suggesting that, at the present time in America,
there are frequent instances of tyranny. I am saying that no guarantee against tyranny
is evident and that the causes for the mildness of the government should be sought
more in circumstances and habits than in the laws.").
144. Boudin, supra note 74, at 2142-43.
145. Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 245
(1997).
146. Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: An Exten-
sion, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1020 (1998).
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But in the last few years, a reexamination confirmed her results. 147 The most
recent study focuses specifically on how gay and lesbian civil rights measures
fare, and found that the LGBT community loses 71% of the time.148 Con-
trary to Cullinane's worries that new technology means political participa-
tion will be chilled, the authors suggest that technology makes bringing
together large, homogenous majorities much easier, and therefore makes
statewide civil rights initiatives more dangerous for LGBT groups.' 4 9
If voters after Reed understand that signing a ballot initiative is an act
of legislating, and therefore something more immediate and efficacious than
a typical election for representatives, the dynamics of the vote may change.
The mob mentality described by social scientists may give way to a more
cautious decision making. And while some might criticize this development
as undemocratic,so the documented history of majorities using public refer-
enda to curtail minority rights should confirm in us the suspicions of the
authors of the Federalists Papers. At the very least, in the context of public
referenda dealing with minority rights, mechanisms to promote deliberation
and caution should be welcomed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Doe v. Reed and ProtectMarriage.corn v. Bowen are both part of a shift
towards a particular understanding of democratic citizenship. This move
towards what political theorists have called civic republicanism should be
welcomed, especially in the context of the continued legal and political bat-
tle for LGBT equality. Even though the Court in Reed did not deal with the
state of Washington's argument that it had an interest in providing informa-
tion about petition signatories to the public, the effect of the ruling is that
voters in public referenda will be acting publically. And when we are en-
gaged in direct democracy, with the rights of a minority at stake, this is
exactly the form that our political action should take. t
147. Donald P. Haider-Markel et al., Lose, Win or Draw? A Reexamination ofDirect De-
mocracy and Minority Rights, 60 POL. REs. Q. 304 (2007).
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